The effect of regulations on financial system stability: an analysis of the impact of the Volcker rule on the US banking system by Dada, Olanrewaju
 
The effect of regulations on financial system stability: 
 
An analysis of the impact of the Volcker rule on the 
                          US banking system 
 
by 
Olanrewaju Dada  
 
A research project submitted in partial fulfilment of 
the requirements for the degree of Master of Finance Master of Finance 
Saint Mary’s University 
Copyright by Olanrewaju Dada 2012 
 
 
                                                Approved:  Dr. Colin Dodds                             
    Faculty Advisor 
                                              Approved:  Dr. Francis Boabang                      
                                                           MFin Director 
August 31, 2012 
 
    
 





I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. J Colin Dodds, who gave me 
valuable insight and support towards the completion of this project. I would also like to 
thank Dr Francis Boabang and all the professors in the Master of Finance Program for their 
professional advice and support. 
 
To my darling wife, Olakunke Abiola Dada thanks for your love, support and encouragement 
throughout this period.  It is a tough one, but I am already seeing the light at the end of the 
tunnel. To my God given gifts - Oluwatoni and Temiloluwa, I say a big “thank you” for your 











    
 




The effect of regulations on financial system stability: An analysis of the impact            




This paper seeks to evaluate the impact of the announcement of the Volcker rule on the 
performance of the stock prices /return on Bank Holding Companies in the US. In order to 
test the effect of this policy change, daily stock prices and trading assets of 415 Bank Holding 
Companies in the United States between 2009-2012 were obtained and were classified into 
three groups according to the value of their trading assets. An event study was carried out on 
the Cumulative abnormal returns of these companies on three different announcement dates 
which are considered vital to the implementation of the rule. 
 
It was observed that U.S capital market reacted negatively to the announcement of the rule on 
those three dates but the effect was more pronounced in the prices of the securities that were 
exposed to proprietary trading (trading assets) and this was significant around the first 
announcement date at the 10% significance level. However, the market also reacted 
negatively on the other two dates, but was not as significant as the first time when the market 
was anticipating the announcement. 
 
This evidence suggests that the Volcker rule had an adverse effect on the securities values of 
banks that engage in proprietary trading and could possibly curb their involvement in these 
speculative trading activities.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
  
To what degree can regulatory policies ensure stability of the financial system and address 
the global financial downturn? This question becomes relevant with the current spate of 
policies and regulatory reforms geared towards addressing the uncertainties in the financial 
system. In particular, there was a ripple effect generated by the public announcement and 
endorsement of Volcker’s rule by President Barak Obama on January 21, 2010.  
 
 
The Volcker rule was proposed and named after the former Federal Reserve (Fed) Chairman 
Paul Volcker who presided over the Economic Recovery Advisory Board set up by the US 
president to provide professional recommendations on economic recovery matters and 
financial sector policies. The rule prohibits any insured depository institution and its affiliates 
from engaging in “proprietary trading” of debt and equity securities, commodities, 
derivatives, or other financial instruments. “Proprietary trading” refers to activities of banks 
which position them to act as a principal in order to profit from near-term price movements 
from their own trading account or supervised nonbank financial company in any transaction 
that relate to purchase or sell, or otherwise acquire or dispose of securities. 
 
 
Technically, the Volcker rule placed limits on some activities rendered by banking entities 
which were considered to have increased the risk level of the financial system. Such activities 
include: 
 Engaging in proprietary trading- Trading activity in which the bank entities acts as a 
principal in order to profit from near-term price movements. 




 Acquiring or retaining equity, partnership or other ownership interest in or sponsoring 
hedge funds or a private equity funds with the exception of those offered in connection 
with a bonafide trust, fiduciary and investment advisory functions and subject to 
minimum limit. 
 Sponsoring a hedge fund or a private equity fund. 
These banking entities include foreign banks that maintain branches or   agencies in the 
U.S. or that own U.S. banks or commercial lending companies in the United States. These 
banks, as well as their parent holding companies, are referred to in U.S. regulations as 
foreign banking organizations 
 
1.1 Background to the study. 
 
A critical review of events that crystallized into the financial turmoil between 2007 and 2009 
revealed that the banking sector contributed to a large percentage of systemic risk 
experienced by the financial system. The financial crisis then raised the concerns over the 
effectiveness of the regulatory mechanism which governs these banking activities and the 
challenges towards the sustenance of the global market economies. It also provided evidence 
that support the time lag of the existing regulatory framework to financial innovation which 
makes it difficult to proactively prevent the crisis.  
 
It is obvious that the roles of banking institutions in globalisation cannot be downplayed. 
Banks provide the financial intermediation which integrates the activities of all other 
financial elements such as financial markets, financial transactions, financial institutions, and 
financial instruments amongst others within and across different geographical locations 




toward the realization of their goals. They also serve as a central hub of the financial system 
using their network base and interconnectivity to support the payment and settlement 
platform of financial instruments all around the globe. If the occurrence of another crisis is to 
be averted, then the activities of the banking institutions should be well monitored and/or 
better regulated. 
 
The financial crisis experienced at the wake of 2007/2008 has a common denominator with 
what was experienced around the period of the Great Depression in the 1930’s following the 
Great Crash of 1929.Both occurred as a result of the involvement of banking institutions in 
excessive speculative  risk  trading positions in the capital market. These risky trading 
positions were geared toward generating excess profits which benefit the management and 
shareholders of banks at the expense of the tax payers whose interest is in the growth of the 
real economy. As a result of the crisis, there has been a great deal of interest in monitoring 
the activities of banks to ensure strong and formidable institutions. This led the US President 
– Barak Obama to institute an Economic Recovery Advisory Board on February 6 2009 with 
the mandate to proffer economic recovery matters and financial sector policies. The Board 
was chaired by the former Federal Reserve chairman, Paul Volcker. 
 
In his submission, Volcker raised concerns on the level of excessive risk undertaken by the 
banking system in the course of their operations. He underlined the fact that those risky 
speculative trading activities led to the high levels of systemic risk being experienced in the 
global financial system. He however, proposed an Act to separate the investment arm of 
banks which are believed to have posed the vulnerabilities to the system from the commercial 
arm that oversee the traditional banking activities of loan creation from deposits which 




support economic growth. He also considered the endemic issue of moral hazard that is 
pertinent with the systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) which was borne out of 
the privilege enjoyed by having access to government support and deposit insurance. This 




On July 21, 2010, the Act was publicly announced and endorsed to put in place a new 
regulatory framework in the financial services industry and was scheduled to be implemented 
on July 21, 2012. Included in the Dodd-Frank Act is a section (619) that imposes restrictions 
on proprietary trading activities of banks and their affiliates. The rule however, made some 
exceptions to trading transactions which involved: 
 US Government securities 
 Securities underwriting or market-making, to the extent that either does not exceed near 
term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties. 
 Trading activities on behalf of customers. 




The mechanism of operation of the Volcker rule is similar in principle to the Securities Act of 
1933 and Glass-Steagall Act which separated commercial banking activities from investment 
banking. These acts were adopted aftermath the Great Depression to address the root cause of 
the crash of the market economies. The cause of the market crash was linked to the “universal 




banking” model that was in operation at the time. The model allowed banking institutions to 
perform various functions in addition to their traditional role of loan creation from customers’ 
deposits. The deregulation in the financial system in the late 1990s led to the end of the 
Glass-Steagall Act and brought about the re-emergence of the universal banking model. 
Although the causes of the financial crisis experienced in 2007-09 are believed to be 
multifaceted in nature they include but are not limited to the response of banking institutions 
to technological innovation, the lax credit lending process, conflict of interest on the part of 
the debt rating agencies, greedy nature of investors amongst others. Despite all these reasons, 
it has been identified that the lack of adequate monitoring and supervisory mechanism on the 
part of the regulator played a pivotal role in the crash of the system. 
 
1.2 Objectives of Study 
 
This paper seeks to evaluate the impact of the announcement of the Volcker rule on the 
performance of the stock prices/return of US banking institutions. I will test to ascertain 
whether regulation has a positive or negative effect on the value of stock prices. To 
effectively measure this effect, we classify the US banking institutions into three different 
categories based on the mode of their operations which revolves around pure commercial 
banking, pure investment banking, and universal banking. This approach was employed to 
address the limitation posed by the non availability of consistent data on proprietary trading 
activities conducted by banking institutions. As it stands there is still a thin line between 
trading activities meant for risk management (hedging) purposes and those intended for 
proprietary trading. It will take a lot of metrics and data analysis to differentiate between the 
two and that is beyond the scope of this paper. Furthermore the effect will also be measured 
on some selected banks which are referred to as systemically important financial institutions 




(SIFIs) due to their interconnectivity with the global financial system and wider coverage 
area within and across the United States geographical boundaries. 
 
 
The impact of the Volcker rule will be assessed on capital market reaction to the 
announcement of the information and market players’ perception of the importance of the 
rule aimed at stabilising the fluctuation experienced in the global financial system. This will 
be achieved by employing the event study methodology to investigate how the US capital 
market reacts to the impact the rule will have on the banking institutions. 
We will examine the effect on 3 different dates which are - January 15, 2009 when the 
President’s advisory committee headed by Paul Volcker released the report that placed limits 
on proprietary trading by banking institutions- July 21
st
, 2010 when President Obama signed 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street reform and Consumer Protection acts into law, which include 
section 619 outlining the Volcker rule and on  July 21
st
 2012 , the supposed implementation 
day of the rule  across  banking institutions in the United States. 
We expect the effect to be pronounced on the announcement of the rule on Jan 15, 2009 
which will be in support of the theoretical assertion that: 
“If regulation has implications for the value of securities, the effects of regulation are 
impounded into prices at the time when they are first anticipated” Schwert (1981). 
 
 
1.3 Chapter organisation /outline 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses a literature review, 
an overview of the rule and the expectation/reaction of market participants on the 
introduction of the rule. Chapter 3 describes our data. Chapter 4 covers the testing 
methodology and empirical results. Chapter 5 provides a conclusion. 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
A central issue of interest is to understand whether the newly introduced Volcker rule do 
address the issues for which it was proposed and if so, what is its effects ( positive or 
negative). Also to ensure that it will not pose any negative effects to existing regulatory 
policies. 
 
Quite a number of studies have been conducted to understand the effect of regulation on the 
return of securities in the capital market most of which are based on the Securities Acts of 
1933 and 1934 Securities Acts proposed by Glass-Stealgal. In the studies conducted 
independently by Benston (1973) and Stigler (1964), it was concluded that the announcement 
of the Acts had little or no observable impact on mean returns. However there exist a 
significant impact in the observed standard deviation. To the best of our knowledge there has 
been no satisfactory explanation of the latter finding. However, Stigler (1964) and Benston 
(1973) present the dispersion as the consequence of “other factors” and quality of 
information. 
 
Allen and Wilhelm (1988) showed that regulation could transfer wealth from one party to 
another. In their study, it was established with empirical evidence that the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 provided a wealth transfer from 
non-Federal Reserve System member banks and Savings and Loans (S&Ls) to Federal 
Reserve Member Banks. Regulation could as well have a disequilibrium effect on the market 
players in an industry. It could equip a party with a competitive advantage over others within 
the same industry. This was highlighted in the study conducted by Cornett and Tehranian 
(1989) with supporting evidence that the banking deregulation passed in 1980 benefited 
stockholders of large banks and savings and loans, but produced negative abnormal stock 




returns for small banks and savings and loans. Das et al (2004) provided some clue as to a 
fundamental question on whether or not regulatory governance matters for financial system 
stability. Using empirical evidence they pointed out that regulatory governance has a 
significant influence on financial system soundness. This was established with variables 
which reflect the macroeconomic conditions, the structure of the banking system, and the 
quality of political institutions and public sector governance. 
 
However, recent studies have focused on the effect of regulation on the global financial 
system and its application towards achieving financial stability, with much emphasis on 
providing lasting solutions to financial crises and proactively preventing their future 
occurrence. Chow and Surti (2011) took a holistic view of the regulatory policies proposed to 
address the issue of the systemically important financial institution. The study showed that 
though the Volcker rule (US) and the retail ring fencing (UK) policies could be presently 
undergoing teething and implementation challenges, the concept is valid as it addresses the 
key policy objectives of mitigating the systemic risk in the financial system as against the 
narrow utility banking model which was considered as having a radical approach. Both 
regulations (Volcker rule and ring fencing) have a common denominator which focused on 
activities classified as being too risky for banking institutions to shed /migrate to the 
unregulated parts of the financial system and considered that it could lead to accumulation of 
systemic risk if left unchecked. 
 
 
 King, et al (2012) investigated the impact of the Volcker rule on US Banks Holding 
Companies (BHCs). In their paper, they measured the perception of the capital market to the 
announcement of the rule as well as the reaction of the BHC’s towards their investment 




strategies most of which are exposed to proprietary trading. They employed event studies to 
observe the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for 3 groups of BHC’s on the announcement 
of the Volcker rule over the window [-10,+10].It was noted that there was a significant 
negative impact on the market value of bank holding companies (BHC’s), especially for large 
BHC’s with largest exposure to proprietary trading business and a counter effect of trading 
position in small and large BHC’s. 
 
Mateus (2011) in his study analysed the advantages and shortcomings of the banking 
regulatory reforms proposed by the Vickers Commission on the UK and compared alongside 
the Volcker rule in the US which are both geared toward addressing the systemic risk in the 
banking sector as well as mitigating challenges posed by moral hazard. He concluded that 
both are effective towards their intended purpose, however he made positive suggestions 
which are aimed at consolidating the reform at both macro and micro-levels. 
 
 
2.1 Overview of the Volcker rule. 
 
The Volcker Rule attempts to re-enact part of the Glass-Steagall Act which created a  legal 
and regulatory framework to separate  commercial banking activities ( deposit collection and 
loan creation ) from investment banking activities ( securities underwriting, market making, 
and other capital market activities) and insurance. This was considered necessary to ensure a 
safe and healthy banking system that is not exposed to the non core banking risk of the 
capital market. The rule was geared towards maintaining the stability of the financial system 
and to increase depositors’ confidence in the system so as to boost the overall real economy.   
 




A very relevant question to ask at this stage is what really brought about the dependence of 
the banking system on the capital market?  The answer cannot but be linked to one of the 
landmark financial innovations of the twentieth century, securitization. 
The advancement in financial innovations in the wake of the 1980s and 1990s birthed the 
originate and distribute model of banking and with it securitization. This has been a major 
development in the financial world. Securitization acts as a bridge that links the activities of 
the banking institutions to that of the capital market. Securitization can be described as a 
process of blending together different types of debt obligations such as mortgages or credit 
card loans which appear as illiquid assets on the balance sheet of a banking institution and 
converting them into liquid traded securities on the capital market. Claims are then issued 
against these securities which serve as benefit to potential investors. The Claims are then 
given ratings by the credit rating agencies according to inherent risk.  
Securitization provides banking institutions with a very efficient way to mitigate credit risks 
through diversification across various sectors of the economy by purchasing claims against 
loans originated by other banks and selling off some of their own loans. It also reduces the 
cost of financing by shifting part of the loans from depositors to capital market investors and 
makes available credit to credit seekers who were previously excluded from receiving bank 
credit. As a result of these economic benefits, securitization grew both in volume and scope, 
with the banking institution shifting from their traditional model of risk management from 
originate to hold to originate to distribute. 
 
 
2.2 Analysis of the Rule: 
 
Impact of Volcker rule on US and Foreign banks 




Major financial institutions in the United States have vehemently criticised the proposed rule 
saying “it is an invasive restriction on one of their most profitable activities “
. 
King et al 
(2012). International banks and head of central banks around the globe have also expressed 
their view about the extra territorial effects of the rule stating that the measure should strictly 
be applied to banks operating in the United States who have access to Federal Reserve 
discount loans and deposit insurance coverage. They argued that the concept underlining the 
rule is valid since the fall out of proprietary trading by US banks was subsidized by the 
taxpayers which helped to stabilise the volatility of the system. But the cross effect on other 
foreign financial entities operating in the US who do not have access to the discount window 
should be considered as well. The Financial Stability Oversight Council ("FSOC") in January 
2011 published a study on the impact of the Volcker Rule on foreign banks,
 
the study 
conveyed that the Volcker Rule applies to domestic banking operations of foreign institutions 
in the US but does not affect their dealings which may include proprietary trading outside the 
shores of the United States. The justification for this was that they are not eligible to discount 
window loans of federal deposit insurance.  
 
With the execution of the rule, most foreign banks’ operations in the US will be impacted and 
could possibly lead to their exit. As a result the market could see a surge in the presence of 
shadow banks. Above all it was concluded that the rule would create systemic risk and wreak 
havoc on the government bond market. Additionally it could affect the globalisation of the 
world economy since it threatened the sovereign trade relationship with the United States 
which is considered as the central hub of the global financial system. Any regulation that 
affects the system will generate ripple effects that will cascade beyond territorial boundaries 
of the USA. 





Analysts and market participants considered the rule as being too complex and difficult to 
implement, as there is no clear cut division between trading activities meant to hedge risk and 
those intended for proprietary trading. The rule will most likely increase borrowing costs for 
foreign governments, reduce liquidity and make the market for foreign government bonds 
more volatile. It may possibly fall into the category of unintended consequences of a 
proposed new regulation. 
 
 
2.3 The impact of Volcker rule on the innovation of financial instruments and Capital 
markets. 
 
Apparently with financial innovation, products such as Collateralized Debt Obligations 
(CDOs),Asset  Backed Commercial papers ( ABS) , Structured investment Vehicles (SIVs) 
,Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) ,and CDS (Credit default Swap) have emerged to change the 
topography of  the financial system. Banking institutions have used CDS to diversify 
portfolios and to transfer credit risk to other entities like the hedge funds which benefit from 
the stream of cash flows on the loans issued out by the banks. This has improved the risk 
management of banks and enabled them to shift from their traditional model of loan creation 
from originate –to- hold to originate –to- distribute; and have resulted in the reduction of the 
real cost of capital in the economy to both lenders and borrowers of funds.  
 
In the study conducted by Whitehead (2012) on the Volcker rule and evolving market. He 
argued that Volcker’s rule was motivated by the desire to return to a traditional banking 
model-to create a regulatory divide much like the Glass Steagall Act but did not incorporate 




the current spate of  technology and sophistication of financial instruments present in the 
global financial system as new regulations should reflect the new relationships in the market 
place. He further stated that if proprietary trading is no longer operated by banks, it will be 
moved to the less regulated institutions (shadow banks) whose activities will increase the 
overall risk level of the financial system. In a nut shell the Volcker rule might not be able to 
provide the much needed regulation due to the continuous innovation and complexities of 
financial instruments as compared with the era of Glass-Steagal. 
 
 
2.4 The role of the Volcker rule on the sovereign debt market 
 
In January 2012 at the World Economic Forum in DAVOS, Switzerland finance ministers all 
over the globe sharply disagreed on the implementation on the rule, particularly a clause 
which stipulates that  
“United States banks — and possibly certain foreign banks that do business in America — 
would be restricted in trading foreign government bonds with an exemption to United States 
government securities”. Timothy Geithner, the Treasury secretary of Federal Reserve. 
They were really concerned that this aspect of the rule will stop the US banking system from 
providing market- making roles for sovereign markets and inadvertently affect the liquidity of 
the overall sovereign markets and increase borrowing costs for foreign governments. George 
Osborne Chancellor of the Exchequer of the UK states that  
“in practice the regulations would appear to make it more difficult and costlier to provide 
market-making services in non-U.S. sovereign markets,” and that “Any consequent 
withdrawal of market-making services by banks would reduce liquidity in sovereign markets, 
which in turn would engender greater volatility and make it more difficult, riskier and costlier 
for countries such as the U.K. to issue and distribute their debt.” 
 




Mizuguchi, Assistant Commissioner for International Affairs at the Japan Financial Services 
Agency, also raised his concern saying - “we are afraid that US financial institutions may 
refrain from trading Japanese government bonds”. He suggested that the rule might increase 
the operational and transactional costs of trading in Japanese government bonds and could 
lead to the exit from Tokyo of Japanese subsidiaries of U.S. banks as well as force Japanese 
banks to reduce their US operations. Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of Canada raised 
his objection to the rule which he envisaged would create its own systemic risk and wreak 
havoc on the government bond market. He also raised concerns on the extra territorial effect 
of the law which could threaten the trade Canada-US agreements and the bilateral 





















Chapter 3: Methodology  
 
3.1 Data Description 
 
For the purposes of this study, a data sample which contains the daily stock prices and trading 
assets of 415 Bank Holding Companies in the United States between 2009-2012 was 
generated from the Bloomberg Terminal – a financial application database that provides real 
time stock prices quotes as well as other timely financial information to a wide network of 
end users. These data were used to evaluate the reaction of the market to the announcement 
of regulatory reform. Basically, this paper focused on the Bank Holding companies since the 




In order to effectively capture the impact of the policy on the Bank Holding Companies, the 
sample data were divided into three subsamples based on trading assets and the level of their 
importance to the stability of the financial system. As a result of the non availability of 
statistical data from the banking institutions since there is no segregation between trading 
activities meant for proprietary trading and those traded on behalf of the bank clients and 
those for risk management, a proxy was considered which is the trading asset which entails 
marketable securities and other short- term investment. This includes liquid investments that 
are expected to be converted to cash within a reasonable short period of time, usually less 
than one year. While we considered those banks which the Federal Reserve used for stress 
tests and comprehensive capital review as systemically important. 
 
 




Out of the 415 banks in the sample data, Fifty seven (57) have no trading assets were 
classified as non trading banks, while the rest with trading assets worth of $ 1 billion were 
classified as trading banks – there were eighty two (82) of such banks. Eighteen banks  (18) 
were also carved out of the banks considered to be involved in trading activities and were 
classified as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). Appendix A provides the 
lists of   these classified bank entities. 
 
 
3.2 Model Design 
 
This paper is seeks to evaluate the market reaction to the proposal, announcement and 
implementation of the Volcker rule on the performance of the stock prices/return of the Bank 
Holding Companies in the United Sates. An event study methodology will be employed in 
this paper to measure the effect. Cumulative abnormal return will be the proxy to test if there 
were significant market reactions.  
 
3.2.1 Estimation Window   
 
An estimation window is set before the event date. The estimation window is considered as a 
period that is prior and after the announcement of the policy when the stock prices are 
expected to behave normally without the influence of any external constraint. This period is 
used to evaluate the normal performances of the prices of the securities of these Bank 
Holding Companies. This paper chooses a 30-day estimation period which is 60 days before 
the announcement date to 31 days after the announcement date. Expected return of the stock  
 




prices of the banks entities are estimated using the coefficient obtained in the equations 
below. 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) was deployed to estimate the performance of the 
companies relative to the performance of the market index. 
                              
 Ri = αi + βiRm +εi                                                                                                   (3.1) 
 
αi        is a measure of the performance of the securities 
βi          is a measure of the performance of the index 
Ri        is the return of the firms 
Rm      is the return of the market 
εi      is the error term. 
The return on S&P 500 index was used as the proxy for the market return in the CAPM 
model as the index tracks 500 US stocks as measured by the value of their shares. Most of the 
securities of the bank holding companies were traded on the index. A linear regression was 
performed to estimate the value of αi and βi.  
 
3.2.2 Event Window 
 
The event window was carefully chosen to span across a nine-day trading period which takes 
into consideration four days before the announcement date and another four days after the 
announcement date. This was intended to effectively capture the existence of any abnormal 
return on the securities which could be attributed to the presence of external constraint prior 
and the after the announcement of the policy. Abnormal return exist if there is an observable 




difference between the actual return of the firm and the estimated return of the firm as 
showed in Equation 3.2 below. 
                    
 
ARi = Ri -  ̅i                                                                                                                                 (3.2) 
 
 
ARi      is the abnormal return of the firm 
Ri            is the actual return in the event window 
 ̅i             is the expected return using the CAPM model. 
 
Cumulative abnormal is the sum of the abnormal returns in the event period      
                                                                     ∑    
 
   
                                                                   
         
  CARi    is the cumulative abnormal return of the firm. 
 
3.3 Empirical Test 
Cumulative abnormal returns are viewed as the market reaction to the securities of the bank 
holding companies in the United States. A positive cumulative abnormal return across the 
firms in the event window confirms that the market believes the policy will create value and 
increases firms’ value, while a negative cumulative abnormal return in the event window 
suggest a negative perception of the policy by the market . The level of the significance of the 
cumulative abnormal return plays a very important role in the measurement of the market  
 




reaction. The effect of the Volcker rule was examined on 3 different announcement dates 
considered critical to its implementation.  
 
              
After testing the market reaction to the announcement of the Volcker rule on the performance 
of the stock prices of the Bank holding Companies on the S&P 500 index, a dummy variable 
was incorporated into the model to measure the difference of the effect in the presence of the 
proprietary trading in the activities of the Bank Holding companies. It is expected that the 
Volcker rule will have a pronounced impact on the performance of the stock prices of those 
banks that are involved in the proprietary trading. 
 
 
Another dummy variable was also incorporated to into the model to observe the reaction on 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) who have large exposure to proprietary 
trading and whose failures could endanger the stability of the financial system. We expect to 
see a more significant effect on the performance of the stocks because of the level of 













Chapter 4: Empirical Results  
 
4.1 Market Reaction 
 
An event study of the stock market reaction to the Volcker rule announcement was conducted 
using a regression model that has the cumulative abnormal return as the dependent variable 
with no independent variable. The test was carried out for with each of the three dates that 
was considered critical to the implementation of the rule. We calculate the cumulative 
abnormal return for the three sample data of the BHCs:  Banks without trading assets, those 
with trading assets and those with trading assets that are considered to be important to 
financial system (SIFIs).  
 
 
Table 4.1(a) - (c) show the results of the market reaction to the publication of the president’s 
advisory committee which proposed the Volcker rule on January 15 2009. In the test 
conducted, the cumulative abnormal return on all BHCs has a negative value of – 1.00668 
(significant at less than 1% level as seen from Table 4.1 (a)). This reflects a huge negative 
market reaction to the stock price of all the Bank holding companies on announcement of the 
rule. A negative stock price reaction to BHC’s which have no trading assets as well as those 
with trading assets was observed. However, the reaction is not statistically significant at 10% 
as seen from Table 4.1(b).  
 
 
Table 4.1(c) showed a mixed market reaction to the announcement within the event window. 
We observed a contrasting empirical result with the expected theoretical evidence. We would 
have expected the impact of the announcement to be greater on the SIFIs but it turns out to be 




otherwise with the coefficient of the constant term negative (-9.177822) and that of the 
dummy variable for difference between the SIFIs and non SIFIs (-0.4000382) with both 
significant at less than 1 % and 10 % respectively. However, the empirical results provide 
support to the evidence that the Volcker rule has a large and negative impact on Bank 
Holding Companies with large exposures to proprietary trading. It also supports the 
theoretical assertion that the effects of regulations are impounded into prices at the time when 
they are first anticipated. 
 
 
Test results of cumulative abnormal return on   January 15, 2009  
Table 4.1 (a) 
Cumulative abnormal return Coef. s.d. t p 
_cons -1.00668* 0.1013468 -9.93 0.000 
      
* Significant at less than 1 % level 
 Table 4.1 (b) 
Cumulative abnormal return Coef. s.d. t p 
Trading  -0.588964 0.6538517 -0.90 0.370 
_cons -1.4322578 0.645729 -0.67 0.505 
    
Table 4.1 (c) 
Cumulative abnormal return Coef. s.d. t p 
SIFIs -0.4000382 0.2411486 -1.66 0.101 
_cons -9.177822 0.1136785 -8.07 0.000 




Table 4.2 (a) – (c) shows the results of the market reaction on July 21, 2010 when President 
Obama signs the Dodd-Frank Act into law which include section 619 referred to as the 
Volcker rule.  The test for the cumulative abnormal returns showed a negative market 
reaction of -0.0614898 to the announcement on all the BHCs and it’s statistically significant 
at less than 10%. The coefficient of the dummy variable which depict the difference between 
BHCs with trading and trading assets reacted positively to the announcement with 
statistically significance of about  10%.While difference between the SIFIs is negative and 
non statistically significant. This tells us that the market has already reacted to the 
information when the rule was first proposed and announced and it no longer has much effect 
when it was eventually signed into law. 
 
 
Test results of cumulative abnormal return on   July 21, 2010. 
Table 4.2 (a) 
Cumulative abnormal return Coef. s.d. t p 
_cons -0.0614898* 0.0215604 -2.85 0.005 
      
* Significant at less than 1 % level 
 
Table 4.2 (b)  
Cumulative abnormal return Coef. s.d. T P 
Trading  0.0972827 0.0566075 1.72 0.089 
_cons -0.14206674 0.0515185 -2.76 0.007 
    





Table 4.2 (c) 
Cumulative abnormal return Coef. s.d. T p 
SIFIs -0.0126224 0.561729 -0.22 0.823 
_cons -0.0591948* 0.0239522 -2.47 -0.015 
* Significant at less than 1 % level 
 
 
Table 4.3 (a) - (c) show the results of the market reaction on July 23,2012, although the 
supposed implementation date of the Volcker rule supposed to be July 21,2012.But this 
happened to fall on a weekend, so market reaction was then tested on the next trading day. 
The test for the cumulative abnormal returns showed a negative market reaction of 0.0177698 
to the announcement on all the BHC’s, but it is not statistically significant. The coefficient of 
the dummy variable which depicts the difference between BHCs with trading and trading 
assets is negative e and statistically significant. While difference between SIFIs is negative 
and non statistically significant.  
 
 
Test results of cumulative abnormal return on   July 21,2012 .  
Table 4.3 (a)  
Cumulative abnormal return Coef. s.d. t p 
_cons -0.0177698 0.0274739 -0.65 0.519 
      
 




Table 4.3 (b)  
Cumulative abnormal return Coef. s.d. t p 
Trading  -0.309111* 0.694912 -4.45 0.000 
_cons -0.2435406* 0.0638926 3.81 0.000 
    
* Significant at less than 1 % level 
Table 4.3 (c ) 
Cumulative abnormal return Coef. s.d. t p 
SIFIs -0.0232896 0.071002 -0.33 0.744 
_cons -0.013448 0.0305858 -0.44 0.661 
 
                       
 














Chapter 5: Conclusions  
 
The evidence obtained from the empirical analysis suggests that the market reacted 
negatively to the announcement of the Volcker rule on each of the three days events. 
However the level of significance of the reactions differs across the three groups of the Bank 
Holding Companies which are classified as; Non Trading, Trading and the Systemically 
Important Financial Institutions.  
 
The impact of the Volcker rule was more pronounced on the security prices of BHC’s with 
trading assets and the SIFI’s which are considered to be involved in proprietary trading, than 
those without trading assets. Market reaction was more visible when it was firstly announced 
on the January 15, 2019 than any of the other two dates and this supports the theoretical 
expectation that if a policy will have an effect on the value of stocks, it will have larger 
impact on its prices when it was first anticipated.  
 
We noticed some discrepancies in the data analysis when compared with theoretical assertion 
by the way the market reacted to the securities prices of the non trading BHCs on 
announcements of the policy. We had expected a positive market reaction, but it turned out 
otherwise. We concluded that it could be due to non availability of actual proprietary trading 
data from the bank since there is no segregation. 
In a nut shell we have observed that the market reacted negatively to the announcement of the 
Volcker rule and this will inadvertently affect the returns and the value of the bank holding 
companies that engage in proprietary trading.   
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Appendix A:  
 
Subsample A : Systemically Important Financial Institutions  
S/N Ticker Short Name 
Mrkt Sec & Other ST 
Invts LF Market Cap 
1  C US Equity   CITIGROUP INC  
                   
1,043,889,979,392.00  
      
88,036,081,664.00  
2 




                       
824,585,027,584.00  
   
141,465,600,000.00  
3 
 GS US 
Equity  
 GOLDMAN 
SACHS GP  
                       
778,741,022,720.00  
      
52,486,160,384.00  
4 




                       
600,573,018,112.00  
      
29,988,200,448.00  
5 
 BAC US 
Equity  
 BANK OF 
AMERICA  
                       
518,062,997,504.00  
      
86,215,598,080.00  
6 
 MET US 
Equity   METLIFE INC  
                       
403,193,004,032.00  
      
36,541,419,520.00  
7 
 WFC US 
Equity  
 WELLS FARGO & 
CO  
                       
342,580,002,816.00  
   
180,386,643,968.00  
8 
 STT US 
Equity   STATE ST CORP  
                       
106,983,997,440.00  
      
19,988,275,200.00  
9 
 BK US 
Equity  
 BANK NY 
MELLON  
                         
91,448,999,936.00  
      
26,496,514,048.00  
                                   




10 PNC US 
Equity  
PNC FINANCIAL  
SE  









                         
56,705,998,848.00  
      
32,852,926,464.00  
12 
 USB US 
Equity   US BANCORP  
                         
47,570,001,920.00  
      
63,378,792,448.00  
13 




                         
33,859,000,320.00  
      
13,594,029,056.00  
14 




                         
28,529,000,448.00  
      
10,006,471,680.00  
15 
 BBT US 
Equity   BB&T CORP  
                         
28,336,001,024.00  
      
22,148,386,816.00  
16 
 FITB US 
Equity  
 FIFTH THIRD 
BANC  
                         
17,614,999,552.00  
      
13,930,724,352.00  
17 
 KEY US 
Equity   KEYCORP  
                         
14,540,000,256.00  
        
7,943,959,552.00  
18 




                            
6,326,000,128.00  
      
65,570,242,560.00  
 
Subsample B: BHCs with no trading assets   
S/N Ticker Short Name 
Mrkt Sec & Other ST 
Invts LF Market Cap 
1  TRCY US  TRI CITY BNKSHS                                                               




Equity  -    143,814,384.00  
2 




                                                         
-    
    
236,359,680.00  
3 
 IBCA US 
Equity  
 INTERVEST BNCS-
A                                                           2,474,960.00 
4 
FCBN 
USEquity   FIRST CITIZEN    
    
462,940,736.00  
5 
 MBVA US 
Equity  
 MILLENNIUM 
BANKS    
                
6,427,771.50  
6 
 HBSI US 
Equity  
 HIGHLANDS 
BANKSH    
              
18,783,066.00  
7 
 NXTYQ US 
Equity  
 NEXITY 
FINANCIAL    
                         
9,319.67  
8 
 CAPB US 
Equity  
 CAPITALSOUTH 
BAN    
                      
54,072.23  
9 
 CNBW US 
Equity   CNB CORP      
10 
 ALRS US 
Equity  
 ALERUS 
FINANCIAL    
            
123,079,544.00  
11 
 HABC US 
Equity  
 HABERSHAM 
BANCRP    
                      
33,823.12  
12 
 KTHN US 
Equity  
 KATAHDIN 
BANKSHS    
              
42,100,552.00  
13 WDFN US   WOODLANDS FINL    25,149,600.00  





 FMWC US 
Equity  
 FIRST 
MANITOWOC    
            
100,650,000.00  
15 
 OXBC US 
Equity  
 OXFORD BANK 
CORP    




Equity  PAB BANKSHARES          1,379.50                     
17 
 DBCP US 
Equity  
 DELMAR 
BANCORP    
                
8,381,007.00  
18 
 WBHC US 
Equity  
 WILSON BANK 
HLDG      
19 
 CPKF US 
Equity  
 CHESAPEAKE 
FINL    
              
47,110,752.00  
20 
 FCMP US 
Equity  
 FIRST 
COMMUNITY    
              
34,405,672.00  
21 
 HPTB US 
Equity   HIGH POINT BANK    
              
34,214,064.00  
22 
 FGFH US 
Equity   FORESIGHT FINL    
              
44,550,240.00  
23 
 HLAN US 
Equity  
 HEARTLAND 
BNCCRP    
              
43,789,004.00  
24 
 MBCR US 
Equity  
 MERCANTILE 
BNCRP    







BARABOO   
              
18,175,582.00  




Equity  BANCORP  
26 
 SBNC US 
Equity  
 SOUTHERN 
BCSH/NC      
27 
 TWCF US 
Equity  
 TOWN & 
COUNTRY F    
              
25,273,972.00  
28 
 MNBT US 
Equity  
 MOUNTAIN 
NATIONA    






COMMUNITY      
30 
 NAFHZ US 
Equity  
 NORTH 
AMERICAN F      
31 
 HYCY US 
Equity   HENRY COUNTY      
32 
 SOME US 
Equity  
 SOMERSET TR 
HLDG      
33 
 ENBP US 
Equity   ENB FINANCIAL    
              
75,659,280.00  
34 
 WBNK US 
Equity  
 WACCAMAW 
BANKSHS    
                      
52,263.57  
35 
 SCSG US 
Equity  
 SOUTHCREST 
FINAN    
              
17,691,876.00  
36 
 TYFG US 
Equity  
 TRI-COUNTY 
FINAN      
37  SNLC US  SECURITY NATL     




Equity  IO  
38 
 CZNL US 
Equity  
 CITIZENS NATL-
KY    
              
40,935,672.00  
39 
 TRVR US 
Equity  
 TWO RIVERS 
FINAN    
              
35,525,400.00  
40 
 MFGI US 
Equity  
 MERCHANTS 
FINAN      
41 
 OCBI US 
Equity  
 ORANGE COUNTY 
BA    






FIRST/SC    





 FIRST SOUTHERN 
B      
44 
 FBIP US 
Equity   FNB BANCORP/PA      
45 
 SAEB US 
Equity  
 SAEHAN 
BANCORP    
              
90,135,192.00  
46 
 HONT US 
Equity   HONAT BANCORP    
              
85,524,080.00  
47 
 DBIN US 
Equity   DACOTAH BANKS      
48 
 DEAR US 
Equity  
 DEARBORN 
BANCORP    
                    
230,571.19  
49  PNBC US  PRINCETON NATL                    




Equity  1,174,608.75  
50 
 BVBC US 
Equity  
 BLUE VALLEY 
BAN    
              
11,535,744.00  
51 
 RCBC US 
Equity   RIVER CITY BANK    
              
72,096,408.00  
52 
 IALB US 
Equity  
 INDEPENDENT 
ALLI      
53 
 CCBD US 
Equity  
 COMMUNI 
CENTRAL    
                      
19,821.37  
54 
 FBTT US 
Equity  
 FIRST BANKERS 
TR    
              
50,299,136.00  
55 
 GABA US 
Equity   GEORGIA BANC    




Equity   PACIFIC CITY FIN      
57 
 KISB US 
Equity   KISH BANCORP      
 
Subsample C: BHCs with Trading Assets (Assets greater than 1 Billion Dollars)   
S/N Ticker Short Name 
Mrkt Sec & Other ST 
Invts LF Market Cap 
1  C US Equity   CITIGROUP INC  
                   
1,043,889,979,392.00  
      
88,036,081,664.00  
2  JPM US  JPMORGAN CHASE                            




Equity  824,585,027,584.00  141,465,600,000.00  
3 
 GS US 
Equity  
 GOLDMAN SACHS 
GP  
                       
778,741,022,720.00  
      
52,486,160,384.00  
4 




                       
600,573,018,112.00  
      
29,988,200,448.00  
5 
 BAC US 
Equity  
 BANK OF 
AMERICA  
                       
518,062,997,504.00  
      
86,215,598,080.00  
6 
 MET US 
Equity   METLIFE INC  
                       
403,193,004,032.00  
      
36,541,419,520.00  
7 
 WFC US 
Equity  
 WELLS FARGO & 
CO  
                       
342,580,002,816.00  
   
180,386,643,968.00  
8 
 STT US 
Equity   STATE ST CORP  
                       
106,983,997,440.00  
      
19,988,275,200.00  
9 
 BK US 
Equity   BANK NY MELLON  
                         
91,448,999,936.00  
      
26,496,514,048.00  
10 
 PNC US 
Equity   PNC FINANCIAL SE  
                         
67,391,000,576.00  
      
33,093,140,480.00  
11 
 COF US 
Equity  
 CAPITAL ONE 
FINA  56,705,998,848.00  32,852,926,464.00  
12 
 USB US 




 STI US 
Equity   SUNTRUST BANKS  
                         
33,859,000,320.00  
      
13,594,029,056.00  
14  RF US  REGIONS                                




Equity  FINANCIA  28,529,000,448.00  10,006,471,680.00  
15 
 BBT US 
Equity   BB&T CORP  
                         
28,336,001,024.00  
      
22,148,386,816.00  
16 
 NTRS US 
Equity   NORTHERN TRUST  
                         
26,843,199,488.00  
      
11,164,798,976.00  
17 
 FITB US 
Equity  
 FIFTH THIRD 
BANC  
                         
17,614,999,552.00  
      
13,930,724,352.00  
18 
 KEY US 
Equity   KEYCORP  
                         
14,540,000,256.00  
        
7,943,959,552.00  
19 
 SIVB US 
Equity  
 SVB FINANCIAL 
GR  
                         
11,753,263,104.00  
        
2,567,355,904.00  
20 
 BOKF US 
Equity   BOK FINL CORP  
                         
11,129,082,880.00  
        
3,908,067,328.00  
21 




                         
10,843,985,920.00  




USEquity   FIRST NIAGARA FI  
                      
10,038,866,944.00  
    
2,796,431,872.00  
23 
 CMA US 
Equity   COMERICA INC  
                            
9,939,999,744.00  
        
6,002,231,808.00  
24 




                            
9,229,637,632.00  
        
3,516,592,896.00  
25 
 CFR US 
Equity   CULLEN/FROST  
                            
8,492,329,984.00  
        
3,415,347,456.00  
26  DFS US  DISCOVER                                   




Equity  FINANCI  8,360,475,136.00  20,013,070,336.00  
27 
 CYN US 
Equity   CITY NATL CORP  
                            
6,928,465,920.00  
        
2,775,472,384.00  
28 
 UMBF US 
Equity   UMB FINANCIAL  
                            
6,397,595,136.00  
        
2,003,742,080.00  
29 




                            
6,326,000,128.00  
      
65,570,242,560.00  
     
 30 
MTB US 
Equity   M&T BANK CORP  
                           
6,078,991,872.00  
     
11,053,419,520.00  
31 




                            
5,208,603,136.00  
        
1,241,719,680.00  
32 
 FHN US 
Equity  
 FIRST HORIZON 
NA  
                            
5,050,634,240.00  
        
2,254,219,520.00  
33 




                            
4,752,400,896.00  




UEquity   FIRST CITIZENS-A    4,710,622,208.00  
    
1,702,967,424.00  
35 
 SNV US 
Equity   SYNOVUS FINL  
                            
3,735,284,992.00  
        
1,608,546,944.00  
36 




                            
3,492,723,968.00  
        
1,114,226,176.00  
37 
 BOH US 
Equity   BANK OF HAWAII  3,353,694,976.00  
    
2,092,461,440.00  
38  ZION US  ZIONS BANCORP                                      




Equity  3,327,374,080.00  3,566,950,400.00  
39 
 WBS US 
Equity   WEBSTER FINL  
                            
3,242,808,064.00  
        
1,881,617,280.00  
40 
 FMER US 
Equity   FIRSTMERIT CORP  
                            
3,235,383,040.00  
        
1,742,211,840.00  
41 




                            
3,046,983,936.00  
        
1,421,026,048.00  
42 




                            
2,935,675,904.00  
        
1,957,800,704.00  
43 




                            
2,879,027,968.00  
        
1,542,383,488.00  
44 




                            
2,719,185,920.00  
        
1,973,942,016.00  
45 




                            
2,570,964,992.00  
        
1,393,880,960.00  
46 
 SF US 
Equity   STIFEL FINANCIAL  
                            
2,569,548,032.00  
        
1,775,983,744.00  
47 
 TCBI US 
Equity  
 TEXAS CAPITAL 
BA  2,523,384,064.00  
    
1,835,617,024.00  
48 
 CVBF US 
Equity   CVB FINANCIAL  
                            
2,472,558,080.00  
        
1,252,193,664.00  
49 
 HBHC US 
Equity  
 HANCOCK HLDG 
CO  
                            
2,365,050,880.00  
        
2,519,617,792.00  
50  STSA US  STERLING                                     




Equity  FINL/WA  2,345,914,880.00  1,313,988,224.00  
51 
 CBU US 
Equity  
 COMMUNITY 
BANK S  
                            
2,284,171,008.00  
        
1,113,181,056.00  
52 
 ONB US 
Equity  
 OLD NATL 
BANCORP  
                            
2,215,546,112.00  
        
1,261,609,600.00  
53 
 BEN US 
Equity  
 FRANKLIN RES 
INC  
                            
2,030,941,056.00  
      
25,033,998,336.00  
54 
 EWBC US 
Equity   EAST WEST BNCRP  
                            
2,011,550,976.00  
        
3,116,986,368.00  
55 




                            
1,993,314,944.00  
        
1,389,241,728.00  
56 
 FFIN US 
Equity   FIRST FIN BANKSH  
                            
1,971,585,024.00  
        
1,094,950,016.00  
57 
 FIBK US 
Equity   FIRST INTER/MT  
                            
1,913,982,976.00  
            
640,598,272.00  
58 
 NPBC US 
Equity   NATL PENN BCSHS  
                            
1,786,267,008.00  
        
1,346,478,208.00  
59 
 WTFC US 
Equity   WINTRUST FINL  
                            
1,754,861,952.00  
        
1,370,566,784.00  
60 
 MBFI US 
Equity   MB FINANCIAL  
                            
1,725,761,024.00  






COMMUNITY  1,720,227,968.00  592,119,424.00  
62  PVTB US  PRIVATEBANCORP                                      




Equity  1,708,692,992.00  1,118,866,560.00  
63 
 CPF US 
Equity   CENTRAL PACIFIC  
                            
1,663,355,008.00  
            
584,066,944.00  
64 
 SBSI US 
Equity  
 SOUTHSIDE BAN 
IN  
                            
1,624,420,992.00  
            
376,856,288.00  
65 
 CRBC US 
Equity   CITIZENS REPUBLI  
                            
1,494,808,064.00  
            
828,758,592.00  
66 
 NYB US 
Equity  
 NY COMM 
BANCORP  
                            
1,470,843,008.00  
        
5,818,315,264.00  
67 
 PCBC US 
Equity  
 PAC CAP 
BANCORP  
                            
1,375,700,992.00  
        
1,511,547,648.00  
68 




                            
1,351,700,992.00  
            
833,913,664.00  
69 
 HTLF US 
Equity   HEARTLAND FINL  
                            
1,348,215,040.00  
            
431,509,952.00  
70 




                            
1,309,261,952.00  
            
930,383,232.00  
71 
 CATY US 
Equity  
 CATHAY 
GENERAL B  
                            
1,271,747,968.00  
        
1,293,473,664.00  
72 
 CNBKA US 
Equity  
 CENTURY BANC -
A  
                            
1,259,160,064.00  
            
174,775,680.00  
73 
 NBTB US 
Equity   NBT BANCORP INC  
                            
1,225,346,944.00  
            
714,523,776.00  
74  CIT US  CIT GROUP INC  1,220,600,064.00     7,605,749,760.00  










                            
1,201,022,976.00  
            
467,868,896.00  
76 
 FMBI US 
Equity   FIRST MIDWEST/IL  
                            
1,190,244,992.00  
            
894,493,184.00  
77 
 TAYC US 
Equity   TAYLOR CAPITAL  
                            
1,178,616,960.00  
            
488,318,400.00  
78 
 FCF US 
Equity  
 FIRST COMMON 
FIN  
                            
1,159,202,048.00  
            
730,979,456.00  
79 




                            
1,113,026,944.00  
            
765,044,032.00  
80 
 FNB US 
Equity   FNB CORP  
                            
1,088,924,032.00  
        
1,539,654,656.00  
81 
 WSBC US 
Equity   WESBANCO INC  
                            
1,030,428,992.00  
            
539,692,352.00  
82 
 BUSE US 
Equity  
 FIRST BUSEY 
CORP  
                            
1,015,844,992.00  











Appendix B: Stata Output 


























Regression Analysis of Cumulative Abnormal Return around July 15, 2012  
 
 
